We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not eventually play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for non-credible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring.
Introduction
The adverse selection approach to reputations is central to the study of longrun relationships. In the complete-information finitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma or chain store game, for example, the intuitively obvious outcome is inconsistent with equilibrium. However, if some player's characteristics are not common knowledge, that player may acquire a reputation for cooperating or playing "tough," rendering the intuitive outcome consistent with equilibrium (Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982) , , and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) ). In other situations, reputation effects impose intuitive limits on the set of equilibria by imposing "high" lower bounds on equilibrium payoffs Levine (1989, 1992) ).
We explore the long-run possibilities for reputation effects in imperfect monitoring games with a long-lived player facing a sequence of short-lived players. The "short-run" reputation effects in these games are relatively clear-cut. In the absence of incomplete information about the long-lived player, there are many equilibria and the long-lived player's equilibrium payoff is bounded below that player's Stackelbeg payoff. However, when there is incomplete information about the long-lived player's type and the latter is patient, reputation effects imply that in every Nash equilibrium, the long-lived player's expected average payoff is arbitrarily close to her Stackelberg payoff.
This powerful implication is a "short-run" reputation effect, concerning the long-lived player's expected average payoff calculated at the beginning of the game. We show that this implication does not hold in the long run: A long-lived player can maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy in a game with imperfect monitoring only if that strategy eventually plays an equilibrium of the corresponding complete-information game.
More precisely, a commitment type is a long-lived player who plays an exogenously specified strategy. In the incomplete-information game, the long-lived player is either a commitment type or a normal type who maximizes expected payoffs. We show (under some mild conditions) that if the commitment strategy is not an equilibrium strategy for the normal type in the complete-information game, then in any Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game, if the long-lived player is normal, almost surely the short-lived players will learn that the long-lived player is normal (Theorems 1 and 2). Thus, a long-lived player cannot indefinitely maintain a reputation for behavior that is not credible given the player's type.
The assumption that monitoring is imperfect is critical. It is straightfor-ward to construct equilibria under perfect monitoring that exhibit permanent reputations. Any deviation from the commitment strategy reveals the type of the deviator and triggers a switch to an undesirable equilibrium of the resulting complete-information continuation game. In contrast, under imperfect monitoring, all public histories are on the equilibrium path. Deviations neither reveal the deviator's type nor trigger punishments. Instead, the long-run convergence of beliefs ensures that eventually any current signal of play has an arbitrarily small effect on the short-lived player's beliefs. As a result, a long-lived player ultimately incurs virtually no cost (in terms of altered beliefs) from a single small deviation from the commitment strategy. But the long-run effect of many such small deviations from the commitment strategy is to drive the equilibrium to full revelation. Reputations can thus be maintained only in the absence of an incentive to indulge in such deviations, that is, only if the reputation is for behavior that is part of an equilibrium of the complete-information game corresponding to the long-lived player's type. The intuition of the previous paragraph is relatively straightforward to formalize when the short-lived player's beliefs are known by the long-lived player. Such a case arises, for example, when the short-lived players' actions are public and it is only the long-lived player's actions that are imperfectly monitored. More generally, this case requires that the updating about the long-lived player's actions be independent of the actions taken by the shortlived player. The long-lived player then knows when the short-lived players' beliefs have converged, making deviations from a non-equilibrium commitment strategy irresistibly costless. Our Theorem 1 covers this case.
The situation is more complicated when the short-lived players' beliefs are not known by the long-lived player. Now, a player trying to maintain a reputation may not know when her opponent's priors have converged and hence when deviations from the commitment strategy are relatively costless. Making the leap from the preceding intuition to our main result requires showing that there is a set of states of the world under which the short-lived player is relatively certain (in the long run) he faces the commitment type of behavior from the long-lived player, and then using this to show that in the even longer run the long-lived player will (correctly) think that the short-lived player is best responding to the commitment type. This ensures that the long-lived player will deviate from any nonequilibrium commitment strategy, yielding the result (our Theorem 2). This situation is important because the analysis also applies to games with private monitoring, situations where there may be no public information (Section 6).
The impermanence of reputation arises at the behavioral as well as at the belief level. Not only do the short-lived players learn that the long-lived player is normal, but asymptotically, continuation play in every Nash equilibrium is a correlated equilibrium of the complete-information game (Theorem 3). Moreover, while the explicit construction of equilibria in reputation games is difficult, we are able to provide a partial converse when the shortlived players' beliefs are known by the long-lived player: Fix a strict Nash equilibrium of the stage game and ε > 0. For all parameter values, there is a Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game such that when the long-lived player is normal, with probability at least 1 − ε, eventually the stage-game Nash equilibrium is played in every period (Theorem 4). Note that this is true even if the long-lived player is sufficiently patient that reputation effects imply that, in all Nash equilibria of the incomplete-information game, the normal type's expected average payoff is strictly larger than the payoff of that fixed stage-game Nash equilibrium. For expositional clarity, most of the paper considers a long-lived player, who can be one of two possible types-a commitment and a normal typefacing a sequence of short-lived players. However, most of our results continue to hold when there are many possible commitment types and when the uninformed player is long-lived (Sections 7 and 8).
While the short-run properties of equilibria are interesting, we believe that the long run equilibrium properties are particularly relevant in many situations. For example, the analyst may not know the age of the relationship to which the model is to be applied. Long-run equilibrium properties may then be an important guide to behavior. In other situations, one might take the view of a social planner who is concerned with the continuation payoffs of the long-run player and the fate of all short-run players, even those in the distant future.
We view our results as suggesting that a model of long-run reputations should incorporate some mechanism by which the uncertainty about types is continually replenished. One attractive mechanism, used in Holmström (1999) , Cole, Dow, and English (1995) , Mailath and Samuelson (2001) , and Phelan (2001) , assumes that the type of the long-lived player is itself determined by some stochastic process, rather than being determined once and for all at the beginning of the game. In such a situation, as these papers show, reputations can indeed have long-run implications.
The next section presents a simple motivating example and discusses related literature. Section 3 describes our model. Section 4 presents the statements of the theorems described above. Section 5.1 presents some preliminary results. Theorem 1 is proved in Section 5.2. Our main result, Theorem 2, is proved in Section 5.3.
Illustrative Example and Related Literature
Consider an infinite-horizon game involving an infinitely-lived player 1 with discount factor δ and a succession of short-lived player 2's who each live for one period. In each period, the stage game given by 1 2 L R T 2, 3 0, 2 B 3, 0 1, 1 (1) is played. This stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium, BR, which is strict.
If the repeated game has perfect monitoring, then we have a version of the folk theorem: the interval [1, 2] is the set of average discounted subgameperfect equilibrium payoffs for player 1 as δ → 1 (Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin (1990) ).
In the incomplete-information game, there is a probability p 0 > 0 that player 1 is the pure Stackelberg type, i.e., a commitment type who plays T in every period, irrespective of history. With complementary probability, player 1 is normal, and hence has payoffs in each period given by (1). Fudenberg and Levine (1989) show that for any payoff u < 2, for δ sufficiently close to 1, in every Nash equilibrium, the average discounted payoff to player 1 is at least u. 1 An equilibrium (for large δ) with an average payoff of 2 is easy to describe: the normal type begins with T , and plays T in every subsequent period (just like the commitment type). If the normal type ever deviates to B, then she plays B forever thereafter. Player 2 begins with L, plays L as long as T has been played, and plays R forever after B is played. Note that, since there is perfect monitoring, player 2 knows that if he observes B, it must be the case that player 1 is normal, so that BR forever is an equilibrium outcome of the continuation game.
We now describe the game with imperfect monitoring. There are two possible public signals, y and y , which depend on player 1's action i according to the distribution
where p > q. Player 2's actions are public. Player 1's payoffs are as in the above stage game (1), and player 2's ex post payoffs are given in the following matrix,
The ex ante payoffs for player 2 are thus still given by (1). This structure of ex post payoffs ensures that the information content of the public signal and player 2's payoffs is the same. This game is an example of what call a moral hazard mixing game. Even for large δ, the long-run player's maximum Nash (or, equivalently, sequential) equilibrium payoff is lower than when monitoring is perfect (Fudenberg and Levine (1994, Theorem 6 .1, part (iii))). 2 For our example, it is straightforward to apply the methodology of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) to show that if 2p > 1 + 2q, then the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs for large δ is given by the interval
There is a continuum of particularly simple equilibria, with player 1 randomizing in every period, with equal probability on T and on B, irrespective of history and player 2's strategy having one period memory. After the signal y , player 2 plays L with probability α and R with probability 1 − α . After y , player 2 plays L with probability α and R with probability 1−α , with 2δ (p − q) α − α = 1.
The maximum payoff of 2 − (1 − p) / (p − q) is obtained by setting α = 1 and
.
As in the case of perfect monitoring, we introduce incomplete information by assuming there is a probability p 0 > 0 that player 1 is the Stackelberg type who plays T in every period. Fudenberg and Levine (1992) show that in this case as well, for any payoff u < 2, there is δ sufficiently close to 1 such that in every Nash equilibrium, the expected average discounted payoff to player 1 is at least u. We emphasize that u can exceed the upper bound in (2). Establishing that u is a lower bound on equilibrium payoffs is significantly complicated by the imperfect monitoring. Player 2 no longer observes the action choices of player 1, and so any attempt by player 1 to manipulate the beliefs of player 2 must be mediated through the full support signals. The explicit construction of equilibria in this case is also very difficult.
In this example, player 2's posterior belief that player 1 is the Stackelberg type is independent of 2's actions and hence public information. As such the example falls within the coverage of our Theorem 1. To develop intuition, temporarily restrict attention to Markov perfect equilibrium, with player 2's belief that player 1 is the Stackelberg type (i.e., player 1's "reputation") being the natural state variable. In any such equilibrium, the normal type cannot play T for sure in any period: if she did, the posterior after any signal in that period is the prior, and continuation play is also independent of the signal. But then player 1 has no incentive to play T . Thus, in any period of a Markov perfect equilibrium, player 1 must put positive probability on B. Consequently, the signals are informative, and so almost surely, when player 1 is normal, beliefs must converge to zero probability on the Stackelberg type. 3 Our analysis is complicated by the fact that we do not restrict attention to Markov perfect equilibria, as well as the possibility of more complicated commitment types than the pure Stackelberg type (for example, we allow for nonstationary history-dependent mixing). In particular, uninformative signals may have future ramifications.
While some of our arguments and results are reminiscent of the recent literature on rational learning and merging, there are also important differences. For example, Jordan (1991) studies the asymptotic behavior of "Bayesian Strategy Processes," in which myopic players play a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game in each period, players initially do not know the payoffs of their opponents, and players observe past play. The central result is that play converges to a one-shot Nash equilibrium of the completeinformation game. In contrast, the player with private information in our game is long-lived and potentially very patient, introducing intertemporal considerations that do not appear in Jordan's model, and the information processing in our model is complicated by the imperfect monitoring.
A key idea in our results (in particular, Lemmas 2 and 5) is that if signals are statistically informative about a player's behavior, then there is little asymptotic value to other players learning private information that has a nontrivial asymptotic impact on the first player's behavior. Similar ideas play an important role in merging arguments, which provide conditions under which a true stochastic process and beliefs over that process converge. Sorin (1999) , for example, unifies much of the existing reputation literature as well as recent results on repeated games with incomplete information using merging. Kalai and Lehrer (1995) , again using merging, provide a simple argument that in reputation games, asymptotic continuation play is a subjective correlated equilibrium of the complete-information game (that result is immediate in our context, since we begin with a Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game, while it is a harder for Kalai and Lehrer (1995) since their hypothesis is a weaker). Subjective correlated equilibrium is a significantly weaker solution concept than objective correlated equilibrium. We discuss the relationship in Section 4.3, where we show that asymptotic continuation play is an objective correlated equilibrium of the complete-information game.
The idea that reputations are temporary is a central theme of Jackson and Kalai (1999) , who are interested in reputation in finitely repeated normal form games (for which Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) prove a reputation folk theorem). Jackson and Kalai (1999) prove that if the finitely repeated normal-form game is itself repeated (call the finite repetition of the original stage a round ), with new players (although not a new draw from a rich set of types) in each round, then eventually, reputations cannot affect play in the finitely repeated game. While the conclusion looks the same as ours, the model is quite different. In particular, players in one round of the finitely repeated game do not internalize the effects of their behavior on beliefs and so behavior of players in future rounds. Moreover, there is perfect monitoring of actions in each stage game. We exploit the imperfection of the monitoring to show that reputations are eventually dissipated even when players recognize their long-run incentives to preserve these reputations.
The Model

The Complete-Information Game
The stage game is a two-player simultaneous-move finite game of public monitoring. Player 1 chooses an action i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I} ≡ I and player 2 simultaneously chooses an action j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J} ≡ J. The public signal, denoted y, is drawn from a finite set, Y . The probability that y is realized under the action profile (i, j) is given by ρ y ij . The ex post stage-game payoff to player 1 (respectively, 2) from the action i (resp., j) and signal y is given by f 1 (i, y) (resp., f 2 (j, y)). The ex ante stage game payoffs are π 1 (i, j) = y f 1 (i, y) ρ y ij and π 2 (i, j) = y f 2 (j, y) ρ y ij . The stage game is infinitely repeated. Player 1 ("she") is a long-lived (equivalently, long-run) player with discount factor δ < 1; her payoffs in the infinite horizon game are the average discounted sum of stage-game payoffs,
The role of player 2 ("he") is played by a sequence of short-lived (or short-run) players, each of whom only plays once.
Players only observe the realizations of the public signal and their own past actions (the period-t player 2 knows the action choices of the previous player 2's). Player 1 in period t has a private history, consisting of the public signals and her own past actions, denoted by
Similarly, a private history for player 2
denote the filtration on (I × J × Y ) ∞ induced by the private histories of player = 1, 2. The public history observed by both players is the sequence (y 0 , y 1 , ..., y t−1 ) ∈ Y t . Let {H t } ∞ t=0 denote the filtration induced by the public histories.
We assume the public signals have full support (Assumption 1), so every signal y is possible after any action profile. We describe circumstances under which this assumption can be weakened in Section 4.1. We also assume that with sufficient observations player 2 can correctly identify, from the frequencies of the signals, any fixed stage-game action of player 1 (Assumption 2).
Assumption 2 (Identification) For all j ∈ J, there are I linearly independent columns in the matrix (ρ y ij ) y∈Y,i∈I .
A behavior strategy for player 1 is a map σ 1 : ∪ ∞ t=0 H 1t → ∆ I , from the set of private histories of lengths t = 0, 1, . . . to the set of distributions over current actions. Similarly, a behavior strategy for player 2 is a map In equilibrium, the short-run player plays a best response after every equilibrium history. Player 2's strategy σ 2 is a best response to σ 1 if, for all t, 5
Denote the set of such best responses by BR(σ 1 ). The definition of a Nash equilibrium is completed by the requirement that player 1's strategy maximizes her expected utility:
Definition 1 A Nash equilibrium of the complete-information game is a strategy profile σ * = (σ * 1 , σ * 2 ) with σ * 2 ∈ BR(σ * 1 ) such that for all σ 1 :
This requires that after any history that can arise with positive probability under the equilibrium profile, player 1's strategy maximize her continuation expected utility. Hence, if σ * is a Nash equilibrium, then for all σ 1 and for all t, P σ * -almost surely
Since every public history occurs with positive probability, the outcome of any Nash equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome.
Never an Equilibrium Strategy in the Long Run
Suppose (σ 1 ,σ 2 ) is an equilibrium of the complete-information game and that we extend this to an incomplete-information game by introducing the possibility of a commitment type who playsσ 1 . The profile in which player 1 always plays like the commitment type and player 2 followsσ 2 is then an equilibrium of the incomplete-information game. Moreover, player 2 learns nothing about the type of player 1 in this equilibrium. Hence, player 1 can maintain a permanent reputation for behavior that would be an equilibrium without that reputation, i.e., in the complete-information game.
More generally, there may be no difficulty in maintaining a reputation for behavior that features nonequilibrium play in the first ten periods and thereafter switches toσ 1 . Questions of whether player 2 will learn player 1's type can only be settled by long-run characteristics of strategies, independent of initial histories. We accordingly introduce the concept of a strategy's being never an equilibrium strategy in the long run. Such a strategy for player 1 has the property that for all best responses by player 2 and all histories h 1t , there is always a profitable deviation for player 1 in periods beyond some sufficiently large T . We emphasize that in the following definition, the BR (σ 1 ) is the set of player 2 best responses in the complete-information game.
Definition 2 The strategyσ 1 is never an equilibrium strategy in the long run, if there exists T and ε > 0 such that, for everyσ 2 ∈ BR(σ 1 ) and for every t ≥ T , there existsσ 1 such that Pσ-a.s,
It is possible for a strategy to never be an equilibrium strategy in the long run for some discount factors, but not for others.
This definition is most easily interpreted when the strategy is either simple or implementable by a finite automaton: Definition 3 (1) A behavior strategy σ 1 is public if it is measurable with respect to {H t }, so that the mixture over actions induced in each period depends only upon the public history.
(2) A behavior strategy σ 1 is simple if it is a constant function, i.e., induces the same (possibly degenerate) mixture over ∆ I after every history.
(3) A public strategy σ 1 is implementable by a finite automaton if there exists a finite set W , an action function d :
, where w (h t ) is the state reached from w 0 under the public history h t and transition rule ϕ.
Any pure strategy is realization equivalent to a public strategy. A simple strategy is clearly public and is implementable by a finite automaton with a single state.
The following Lemma shows that for simple strategies or strategies implementable by a finite automata, being never an equilibrium in the long run is essentially equivalent to not being part of a Nash equilibrium of the stage game or the complete-information repeated game. The point of Definition 2 is to extend this concept to strategies that have transient initial phases or that never exhibit a stationary structure.
Lemma 1 Assume the monitoring has full support (Assumption 1).
1.1 Suppose player 2 has a unique best reply to some mixture ς ∈ ∆ I .
The simple strategy of always playing ς is never an equilibrium strategy in the long run if and only if ς is not part of a stage-game Nash equilibrium.
1.2 Supposeσ 1 is a public strategy implementable by the finite automaton (W, d, ϕ, w 0 ), with every state in W reachable from every other state in W under ϕ. If player 2 has a unique best reply to d (w) for all w ∈ W , thenσ 1 is never an equilibrium strategy in the long run if and only if σ 1 is not part of a Nash equilibrium of the complete-information game.
Proof. We prove only part 2, since part 1 is similar (but easier). The only if direction is obvious. So, supposeσ 1 is not a Nash equilibrium of the complete-information game. Since player 2 always has a unique best reply to d (w), σ 2 is public, and can also be represented as a finite state automaton, with the same set of states and transition function asσ 1 . Sinceσ 1 is not a Nash equilibrium, there is some state w ∈ W , and some action i not in the support of d (w ) such that when the state is w , playing i and then followingσ 1 yields a payoff that is strictly higher than followingσ 1 at w . Since the probability of reaching w from any other state is strictly positive (and so bounded away from zero),σ 1 is never an equilibrium in the long run.
The example from Section 2 illustrates the necessity of the condition in Lemma 1 that player 2 have a unique best response. The simple strategy that places equal probability on T and B is part of many equilibria of the complete-information game (as long as δ > 1/ [2 (p − q)]), and hence fails the criterion for being never an equilibrium strategy in the long run. However, this strategy is not part of an equilibrium of the stage game, in contrast to Lemma 1.1. On the other hand, player 2 has a unique best response to any mixture in which player 1 randomizes with probability of T strictly larger than If we were only interested in the presence of "Stackelberg" commitment types, and the attendant lower bounds on player 1's ex ante payoffs, it would suffice to consider commitment types who follow simple strategies. However, allowing more general types leaves the structure of the argument unaffected while simplifying our discussion of the case where player 2 is also long-lived (see Section 8).
The Incomplete-Information Game
We now formally describe the game with incomplete information about the type of player 1. For expositional clarity only, much of our analysis focuses on the case of one commitment type. Section 7 discusses the case of many commitment types.
At time t = −1 a type of player 1 is selected. With probability 1 − p 0 she is the "normal" type, denoted n, with the preferences described above. With probability p 0 > 0 she is a "commitment" type, denoted c, who plays a fixed, repeated-game strategyσ 1 .
A state of the world is now a type for player 1 and sequence of actions and signals. The set of states is then Ω = {n, c}
∞ . The prior p 0 , commitment strategyσ 1 and the strategy profile of the normal players σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) induce a probability measure P over Ω, which describes how an uninformed player expects play to evolve. The strategy profileσ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) (respectivelyσ) determines a probability measureP (respectivelyP ) over Ω, which describes how play evolves when player 1 is the commitment (respectively normal) type. SinceP andP are absolutely continuous with respect to P , any statement that holds P -almost surely, also holdsP -andP -almost surely. Henceforth, we will use E[·] to denote unconditional expectations taken with respect to the measure P .Ẽ[·] andÊ [·] are used to denote conditional expectations taken with respect to the measuresP andP . Generic outcomes are denoted by ω. The filtrations
∞ can also be viewed as filtrations on Ω in the obvious way;
we use the same notation for these filtrations (the relevant sample space will be obvious). As usual, denote by H ∞ the σ-algebra generated by ∪ ∞ t=0 H t . For any repeated-game behavior strategy σ 1 : ∪ ∞ t=0 H 1t → ∆ I , denote by σ 1t the tth period behavior strategy, so that σ 1 can be viewed as the sequence of functions (σ 10 , σ 11 , σ 12 , . . .) with σ 1t : H 1t → ∆ I . We extend σ 1t from H 1t to Ω in the obvious way , so that σ 1t (ω) ≡ σ 1t (h 1t (ω)), where h 1t (ω) is player 1's t-period history under ω. A similar comment applies to σ 2 .
Given the strategy σ 2 , the normal type has the same objective func-tion as in the complete-information game. Player 2, on the other hand, is maximizing E[ π 2 (i t , j) | H 2t ], so that after any history h 2t , he is updating his beliefs over the type of player 1 that he is facing. 6 The profile (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game if each player is playing a best response. At any equilibrium, player 2's posterior belief in period t that player 1 is the commitment type is given by the H 2t -measurable random variable p t : Ω → [0, 1]. By Assumption 1, Bayes' rule determines this posterior after all sequences of signals. Thus, in period t, player 2 is maximizing
P -almost surely. At any Nash equilibrium of this game, the belief p t is a bounded martingale with respect to the filtration {H 2t } t and measure P . 7 It therefore converges P -almost surely (and henceP -andP -almost surely) to a random variable p ∞ defined on Ω. Furthermore, at any equilibrium the posterior p t is aP -submartingale and aP -supermartingale with respect to the filtration {H 2t }.
A final word on notation: The expressionẼ [σ 1t |H 2s ] is the standard conditional expectation, viewed as a H 2s measurable random variable on Ω, whileẼ [σ 1 (h 1t ) |h 2s ] is the conditional expected value of σ 1 (h 1t ) (with h 1t viewed as a random history) conditional on the observation of the history h 2s .
Impermanent Reputations
Consider an incomplete-information game, with a commitment type strategy that is never an equilibrium strategy in the long run. Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium in which both the normal and the commitment type receive positive probability in the limit (on a positive probability set of histories). On this set of histories, player 2 cannot distinguish between signals generated by the two types (otherwise player 2 can ascertain which type he is facing), and hence must believe, on this set of histories, that the normal and commitment types are playing the same strategies on average. But then player 2 must eventually, again on the same set of histories, best reply to the average behavior of the commitment type. Since the commitment type's behavior is never an equilibrium strategy in the long run, player 1 does not find it optimal to play the commitment-type strategy in response to 2's best response, leading us very close to a contradiction.
There are two difficulties in making this argument precise. First, since the game has imperfect monitoring, player 2 has imperfect knowledge of player 1's private history and thus the continuation strategy of player 1. If the commitment type strategy is not pure, it may be that the normal type is following a private strategy that on average is like the public commitment strategy, but which is different from the latter on every history. Second, the set of histories upon which the argument proceeded is typically not known by either player at any point (although it will be in H 2∞ ). Consequently, player 1 may never know that player 2 is best responding to the average play of the commitment type.
These two difficulties interact. Our first and easier result (Theorem 1) is for the case where the informativeness of the signal about player 1's action is independent of player 2's action. In this case, in any equilibrium, player 2's beliefs about the type of player 1 are public and so the second difficulty does not arise. We can then surmount the first difficulty to show that reputations are impermanent, even when the commitment type is following a mixed public strategy.
The second, harder result (Theorem 2) is for the case where the informativeness of the signal about player 1's action depends on player 2's action. This case is important because, as we describe in Section 6, it also covers games with private monitoring. In this case, we can only show that reputations are impermanent when we remove the first difficulty by imposing the stronger requirement that the commitment type is following a pure (though not necessarily simple or finitely-implementable) strategy.
Theorem 1 is presented in the next subsection with its proof given in Section 5.2, Theorem 2 is presented in Section 4.2 and proved in Section 5.3. (Some preliminaries are presented in Section 5.1.) The behavioral implications of the theorems are discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
The "Easy" Case: Player 2's Beliefs Known
In the "easy" case, player 2's beliefs about player 1 are known by player 1.
The full support assumption (Assumption 1) implies that player 1 in general does not know the action choice of player 2. Under the following assumption, however, player 1 can calculate 2's inference without knowing 2's action:
Assumption 3 (Independence) For any (possibly mixed) actions ζ 1 ∈ ∆ I , signal y ∈ Y , and actions i, j, and j ,
where Pr{i|y, j, ζ 1 } is the posterior probability of player 1 having chosen pure action i, given mixed action ζ 1 and given that player 2 observed signal y after playing action j.
Theorem 1 Suppose ρ satisfies Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. Supposeσ 1 is a public strategy with finite range that is never an equilibrium strategy in the long run. Then in any Nash equilibrium, p t → 0P -almost surely.
The definition of never an equilibrium in the long run requires player 1's period-t deviation to generate an expected payoff increase, conditional on reaching period t, of at least ε. Our proof rests on the argument that if players are eventually almost certain that the normal type player 1 is behaving like a commitment type that is never an equilibrium in the long run, then the normal type will have a profitable deviation. Without the ε wedge in this definition, it is conceivable that while players become increasingly certain that the normal type is playing like the commitment type, the payoff premium to deviating from the nonequilibrium commitment-type strategy declines sufficiently rapidly as to ensure that the players are never certain enough to support a deviation. The ε-uniform bound on the profitability of a deviation precludes this possibility.
Section 5.1.2 explains how the assumptions thatσ has a finite range plays a role similar to that of the ε just described. The requirement that σ 1 be public ensures that whenever player 2 is convinced that player 1 is playing like the commitment type, player 2 can identify the period-t strategy realizationσ 1 (h 1t ) and play a best response.
A sufficient condition for Assumption 3 is that the public signal y be a vector (y 1 , y 2 ) ∈ Y 1 × Y 2 = Y , with y 1 a signal of player 1's action and y 2 an independent signal of player 2's action. In this case, action i induces a probability distribution ρ i over Y 1 while action j induces ρ j over Y 2 , with
The full-support Assumption 1 can be relaxed if (3) holds. The key ingredient in the proof of Theorem 1 is that players 1 and 2 are symmetrically informed about 2's beliefs, and that the signal not reveal player 1's action (so that trigger profiles are not equilibria). Assumption 1 can thus be replaced by the requirement that, for all i and y 1 ∈ Y 1 ,
Assumption 2, in the presence of (3), is equivalent to the requirement that there are I linearly independent columns in the matrix (ρ
Since the key implication of Assumption 3 is that player 1 knows player 2's posterior belief, an alternative to Assumption 3 is to assume that player 2's actions are public, while maintaining imperfect public monitoring of player 1's actions. In this case, Y = Y 1 × J, where Y 1 is the set of public signals of player 1's actions, and
for all i ∈ I, j = j ∈ J, and y 1 ∈ Y . The public nature of player 2's actions implies that H 2t = H t , and hence p t is measurable with respect to H t (and so player 1 knows the posterior of belief of player 2). When player 2's actions are public, the full support assumption is
for all (i, j) ∈ I × J and y 1 ∈ Y 1 , while the identification assumption is now that for all j ∈ J, there are I linearly independent columns in the matrix
The Harder Case: Player 2's Beliefs Unknown
The harder case is where player 2's beliefs about player 1 are not known by player 1. Our method of proof requires that player 1 can draw inferences about player 2's actions, and the following assumption allows this:
Assumption 4 For all i ∈ I, there are J linearly independent columns in the matrix (ρ y ij ) y∈Y,j∈J . This assumption is dramatically weaker than Assumption 3. Consider the example of Section 2, except that player 2's choice of L or R is private. Let ρ ij be the probability of the signal y under the action profile ij ∈ {T, B} × {L, R}, so that the probability of the signal y is given by 1 − ρ ij . Assumption 2 requires ρ T L = ρ BL and ρ T R = ρ BR , while Assumption 4 requires ρ T L = ρ T R and ρ BL = ρ BR . The assumptions are satisfied if ρ T L > ρ BL and ρ T R < ρ BR , so that y is a signal that player 1 has played T if player 2 had played L, but is a signal that she had played B if 2 had played R. Unless player 1 knows the action of player 2, she will not know how the signal is interpreted.
As we discussed at the beginning of this section, the cost of weakening Assumption 3 to Assumption 4 is that we must assume the commitment type does not randomize. The commitment type's strategy, while pure, can still depend upon histories in arbitrarily complicated ways. We also emphasize that we are not imposing any restrictions on the normal type's behavior (other than it be a best response to the behavior of the short-lived players).
Theorem 2 Suppose ρ satisfies Assumptions 1, 2, and 4. Supposeσ 1 is a pure strategy that is never an equilibrium strategy in the long run. Then in any Nash equilibrium, p t → 0P -almost surely.
Since any pure strategy is realization equivalent to a public strategy, it is again the case that whenever player 2 is convinced that player 1 is playing like the commitment type, player 2 can identify the period-t strategy realizationσ 1 (h 1t ) and play a best response.
Asymptotic Equilibrium Play
We now explore the implications for equilibrium play of the impermanence of reputations. More precisely, we will show that in the limit, the normal type of player 1 and player 2 play a correlated equilibrium of the completeinformation game. Hence, differences in the players' subjective beliefs about how play will continue vanish in the limit. This strengthens the result on convergence to subjective equilibria (see below) obtained by Kalai and Lehrer (1995, Corollary 4.4.1) . To begin, we describe some notation for the correlated equilibrium of our repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
We use the term continuation game for the game with initial period in period t, ignoring the period t-histories. 8 We use the notation t = 0, 1, 2, ... for a period of play in a continuation game (which may be the original game) and t for the time elapsed prior to the start of the continuation game. A pure strategy for player 1, s 1 , is a sequence of maps s 1t : H 1t → I for t = 0, 1, . . .. 9 Thus, s 1t ∈ I H 1t and s 1 ∈ I ∪ t H 1t ≡ S 1 , and similarly s 2 ∈ S 2 ≡ J ∪ t H 2t . The spaces S 1 and S 2 are countable products of finite sets. We equip the product space S ≡ S 1 × S 2 with the σ-algebra generated by the cylinder sets, denoted by S. Denote the players' payoffs in the infinitely repeated game (as a function of these pure strategies) as follows
The expectation above is taken over the action pairs (i t , j t ). These are random, given the pure strategy profile (s 1 , s 2 ), because the pure action played in period t depends upon the random public signals.
In the following definitions, we follow Hart and Schmeidler (1989) in using the ex ante definition of correlated equilibria for infinite pure strategy sets. Note also that we need player 2's incentive compatibility conditions to hold at all times t , because of player 2's zero discounting.
Definition 4 A subjective correlated equilibrium of the complete-information game is a pair of measures µ , = 1, 2, on (S, S) such that for all Smeasurable functions ζ 1 :
A correlated equilibrium of the complete-information game is a subjective correlated equilibrium satisfying µ 1 = µ 2 .
Let M denote the space of probability measures µ on (S, S), equipped with the product topology. Then, a sequence µ n converges to µ if, for each τ > 0, we have
Moreover, M is sequentially compact with this topology. Payoffs for players 1 and 2 are extended to M in the obvious way. Since player 1's payoffs are 9 Note that we have used σ1 for general behavior strategies, not only pure strategies.
discounted, the product topology is strong enough to guarantee continuity of u 1 : M →R. Each player 2's payoff is trivially continuous. The set of mixed strategies for player is denoted by M . Fix an equilibrium of the incomplete-information game with imperfect monitoring. When player 1 is the normal (respectively, commitment) type, the monitoring technology and the behavior strategies (σ 1 , σ 2 ) (resp., (σ 1 , σ 2 )) induce a probability measureφ t (resp.,φ t ) on the t-period histories (h 1t , h 2t ) ∈ H 1t ×H 2t . If the normal type of player 1 observes a private history h 1t ∈ H 1t , her strategyσ 1 , specifies a behavior strategy in the continuation game. This behavior strategy is realization equivalent to a mixed strategyλ h 1t ∈ M 1 for the continuation game. Similarly, the commitment type will play a mixed strategyλ h 1t ∈ M 1 for the continuation game and player 2 will form his posterior p t (h 2t ) and play the mixed strategy λ h 2t ∈ M 2 in the continuation game. Conditional on player 1 being normal, the composition of the probability measureφ t and the measures (λ h 1t , λ h 2t ) induces a joint probability measure,ρ t , on the pure strategies in the continuation game and player 2's posterior (the space S × [0, 1]). Similarly, conditional upon player 1 being the commitment type, there is a measureρ t on S × [0, 1]. Letμ t denote the marginal ofρ t on S andμ t denote the marginal ofρ t on S.
At the fixed equilibrium, the normal type is playing in an optimal way from time t onwards given her available information. This implies that for all S-measurable functions ζ 1 :
Let S × B denote the product σ-algebra on S × [0, 1] generated by S on S and the Borel σ-algebra on [0, 1]. Player 2 is also playing optimally from time t onwards, which implies that for all S × B-measurable functions ξ 2 : S 2 × [0, 1] → S 2 , and for all t ,
Comparing the previous two inequalities with (5) and (6), it is clear that the equilibrium behavior from period t onwards is a subjective correlated equilibrium for the continuation game for all t.
If we had metrized M, a natural formalization of the idea that asymptotically, the normal type and player 2 are playing a correlated equilibrium is that the distance between the set of correlated equilibria and the induced distributionsμ t on S goes to zero. While M is metrizable, a simpler and equivalent formulation is that the limit of every convergent subsequence of {μ t } is a correlated equilibrium. This equivalence is an implication of the sequential compactness of M, since every subsequence of {μ t } has a convergent sub-subsequence. The proof is in Section A.1.
Theorem 3 Fix a Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game and suppose p t → 0P -almost surely. Letμ t denote the distribution on S induced in period t by the Nash equilibrium. The limit of every convergent subsequence is a correlated equilibrium of the complete-information game.
Since players have access to a coordination device, namely histories, in general it is not true that Nash equilibrium play of the incompleteinformation game eventually looks like Nash equilibrium play of the completeinformation game.
Suppose the Stackelberg payoff is not a correlated equilibrium payoff of the complete-information game. Recall that Fudenberg and Levine (1992) provide a lower bound on equilibrium payoffs in the incomplete-information game of the following type: Fix the prior probability of the Stackelberg (commitment) type. Then, there is a value for the discount factor,δ, such that if δ >δ, then in every Nash equilibrium, the long-lived player's ex ante payoff is essentially no less than the Stackelberg payoff. The reconciliation of this result with Theorem 3 lies in the order of quantifiers: while Fudenberg and Levine (1992) fix the prior, p 0 , and then selectδ (p 0 ) large (withδ (p 0 ) → 1 as p 0 → 0), we fix δ and examine asymptotic play, so that eventually p t is sufficiently small thatδ (p t ) > δ.
We do not know if Nash equilibrium play in the incomplete-information game eventually looks like a public randomization over Nash equilibrium play in the complete-information game. 10
Impermanent Restrictions on Behavior
We now provide a partial converse to the previous section by identifying a class of equilibria of the complete-information game to which equilibrium play of the incomplete-information game can converge. The construction of equilibria in incomplete-information games is difficult, and so we restrict attention to the case in which the posterior beliefs of player 2 are known by player 1.
Recall that in the example of Section 2, the stage game has a (unique) strict Nash equilibrium BR. Moreover, this achieves player 1's minmax utility. It is a straightforward implication of Fudenberg and Levine (1992) that the presence of the commitment type ensures that, as long as player 1 is sufficiently patient, for much of the initial history of the game, in every equilibrium, play is like T R. On the other hand, an implication of Theorem 4 below, is that for the same parameters, (in particular, the same prior probability of the commitment type), there is an equilibrium in which with arbitrarily high probability underP , BR is eventually played in every period. The construction of such an equilibrium must address the following two issues. First, reputation effects may ensure that for a long period of time, equilibrium play will be very different from BR (this is just Fudenberg and Levine (1992) ). Theorem 4 is consistent with this, since it only claims that in the equilibrium of interest, BR is eventually played in every period with high probability. The second issue is that, even if reputation effects are not initially operative (because the initial belief that player 1 is the commitment type is low relative to the discount factor), with positive probability (albeit small), a sequence of signals will arise that will make reputation effects operative (because the posterior that player 1 is the commitment type is increased sufficiently).
Theorem 4 Suppose the assumptions of Theorem 1 are satisfied (i.e., ρ satisfies Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, andσ 1 is a public strategy with finite range that is never an equilibrium strategy in the long run). Suppose (i * , j * ) is a strict Nash equilibrium of the stage game. Given any prior p 0 and any δ, for all ε > 0, there exists a Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game in which theP -probability of the event that eventually (i * , j * ) is played in every period is at least 1 − ε.
The proof is in Section A.2.
Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
Preliminary results
Player 2's Posterior Beliefs
The first step is to show that either player 2's expectation (given his private history) of the strategy played by the commitment type is in the limit iden-tical to his expectation of the strategy played by the normal type, or player 2's posterior probability that player 1 is the commitment type converges to zero (given that player 1 is indeed normal). This is an extension of a familiar merging-style argument to the case of imperfect monitoring. If, for a given private history for player 2, the distributions generating his observations are different for the normal and commitment types, then he will be updating his posterior, continuing to do so as the posterior approaches zero. His posterior converges to something strictly positive only if the distributions generating these observations are in the limit identical for each private history. In the statement of the following Lemma, h 1t is to be interpreted as a function from Ω to (I × Y ) t .
Lemma 2 At any Nash equilibrium of a game satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2, 11
Proof. Let p t+1 (h 2t ; j t , y t ) denote player 2's belief in period t + 1 after playing j t in period t, observing the signal y t in period t, and given the history h 2t . By Bayes' rule,
The probability player 2 assigns to observing the signal y t from the commitment type isÊ[ i∈Iσ i 1 (h 1t )ρ yt ijt |h 2t ], and from the normal type isẼ[ i∈Iσ i 1 (h 1t )ρ yt ijt |h 2t ]. Using the linearity of the expectations operator, we write p t+1 (h 2t ; j t , y t ) as
Rearranging this formula allows us to write
The summation on the right is bounded above by max i ρ yt ijt < 1, thus
We use x to denote the sup-norm on R n .
For any fixed realization y of the signal y t , it follows that for all h 2t and j t ,
Since p t is a P -almost sure convergent sequence, it is Cauchy P -almost surely. 12 So the right hand side of (10) converges to zero P -almost surely. Thus, for any y,
Hence, if both types are given positive probability in the limit then the frequency that any signal is observed is identical under the two types. We now show that (11) implies (9). Let Π jt be a |Y | × |I| matrix whose y-th row, for each signal y ∈ Y , contains the terms ρ y ijt for i = 1, . . . , |I|. Then as (11) holds for all y (and Y is finite), it can be restated as
where . is the supremum norm. By Assumption 2, the matrices Π jt have I linearly independent columns for all j t , so x = 0 is the unique solution to Π jt x = 0 in R I . In addition, there exists a strictly positive constant b = inf j∈J,x =0 Π j x / x . Hence Π j x ≥ b x for all x ∈ R I and all j ∈ J. From (12), we then get
which implies (9).
Condition (9) says that either player 2's best prediction of the normal type's behavior at the current stage is identical to his best prediction of the commitment type's behavior (that is, Ê [σ 1t | H 2t ] −Ẽ[σ 1t | H 2t ] → 0 P -almost surely), or the type is revealed (that is, p t (1 − p t ) → 0 P -almost surely). However, lim p t < 1P -almost surely, and hence (9) implies a simple corollary: 13 Corollary 1 At any equilibrium of a game satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2,
Player 2's Behavior
We next show that if player 2 believes player 1's strategy is close to the commitment strategy, then 2's best response is a best response to the commitment type.
Lemma 3 Supposeσ 1 has a finite range. There exists ψ > 0 such that for any history h 1s and any ζ 1 ∈ ∆ I satisfying ζ 1 −σ 1 (h 1s ) < ψ, a best response to ζ 1 is also a best response toσ 1 (h 1s ).
Proof. The best response correspondence is upper semi-continuous. Thus, for any mixed actionσ 1 (h 1s ), there exists a ψ(σ 1 (h 1s )) > 0 such that a best response to any mixed action ζ 1 which satisfies ζ 1 −σ 1 (h 1s ) < ψ(σ 1 (h 1s )) is also a best response toσ 1 (h 1s ). We then let ψ be the minimum of such ψ(σ 1 (h 1s )) over the finite range ofσ.
Thus, if player 2 believed his opponent was "almost" the commitment type, then 2 would be playing the same equilibrium action as if he was certain he was facing the commitment type.
The finiteness of the range ofσ ensures that the minimum of the ψ(σ 1 (h 1s )) is strictly positive. Otherwise, player 2 could conceivably become ever more convinced that the normal type is playing like the commitment type, only to have the commitment type's stage-game action drift in such a way that player 2 is never sufficiently convinced of commitment-type play to choose a best response to the commitment type.
Beliefs about Player 2's Beliefs
Lemma 4 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Suppose there exists aP -positive measure set of states A on which lim t→∞ p t (ω) > 0. Then, for sufficiently small η, there exists a set F ⊂ A withP (F ) > 0 such that, for any ξ > 0, there exists T for which, on F ,
If Assumption 3 also holds, then for all ψ > 0,
uniformly on F .
Proof. Define the event D η = {ω ∈ A : lim t→∞ p t (ω) > 2η}. Because the set A on which lim t→∞ p t (ω) > 0 hasP -positive measure, for any η > 0 sufficiently small, we haveP (D η ) > 2µ, for some µ > 0. 
Egorov's Theorem (Chung (1974, p. 74) ) then implies that there exists F ⊂ D η such thatP (F ) ≥ µ on which the convergence of p t andẼ[Z t |H 2t ] is uniform. Hence, for any ξ > 0, there exists a time T such that the inequalities in (13) and (14) hold almost everywhere on F for all t > T . Fix ψ > 0. Then, for all ξ > 0, (14) holds for ξ = ξ ψ, which implies that, uniformly on F ,
But if Assumption 3 holds, then player 2's beliefs are measurable with respect to H t , so that (15) holds.
Proof of Theorem 1 (the "Easy" Case)
Sinceσ 1 is never an equilibrium strategy in the long run, from Definition 2, there existsT such that after any positive probability history of length at leastT ,σ 1 is not a best response to any strategy σ 2 ∈ BR(σ 1 ) of player 2 that best responds toσ 1 . Indeed, there exists η > 0 such that this remains true for any strategy of player 2 that attaches probability at least 1 − η to any strategy in BR(σ 1 ).
Let γ ≡ min y,i,j ρ y ij , which is strictly positive from Assumption 1. Sincê σ 1 is a strategy with a finite range,
Suppose that there is a positiveP -probability set of outcomes A on which p t 0. Choose ξ, ζ such that ζ < βγ and ξ < min {ψ, β − ζγ}, where ψ is the bound from Lemma 3. By (15), there is aP -positive measure set F ⊂ A and T ≥T such that, on F and for any t > T , 
Let
Using the fact that {H 1t } t is a finer filtration than {H t } t for the first equality, we havẽ
and so on F ,
i.e.,P (g t > 1 − η|H t ) > 1 − ζ, or equivalently,
i.e., player 2 assigns a probability of at least 1 − ζ to player 1 believing with probability at least 1 − η that player 2 believes player 1's strategy is within ξ of the commitment strategy. Because the commitment strategy is public, Lemma 3 ensures that player 2 plays a best response to the commitment strategy whenever believing that 1's strategy is within ξ of the commitment strategy. Hence, player 2 assigns a probability of at least 1 − ζ to player 1 believing that player 2 is best responding toσ 1 with at least probability 1 − η.
We now argue that there is a period t ≥ T and an outcome in F such thatσ 1 is not optimal in period t. Given any outcome ω ∈ F and a period t ≥ T , let h t be its t-period public history. There is a K > 0 such that for any t large, there is a public history y t , . . . , y t+k , 0 ≤ k ≤ K, under whichσ 1 (h t , y t , . . . , y t+k ) puts positive probability on a suboptimal action. (Otherwise, no deviation can increase the period-t expected continuation payoff by at least ε.) Moreover, by full support, any K sequence of signals has probability at least λ > 0. If the public history (h t , y t , . . . , y t+k ) is consistent with an outcome in F , then we are done. So, suppose there is no such outcome. That is, for every t ≥ T , there is no outcome in F for whichσ 1 attaches positive probability to a suboptimal action within the next K periods. Letting C t (F ) denote the t-period cylinder set of F , P (F ) ≤P (C t+K (F )) ≤ (1 − λ)P (C t (F )) (since the public history of signals that leads to a suboptimal action has probability at least λ). Proceeding recursively from T , we haveP (F ) ≤P (C T + K (F )) ≤ (1 − λ) P (C T (F )), and letting → ∞, we haveP (F ) = 0, a contradiction.
Hence, there is a period t ≥ T and an outcome in F such that one of the actions in the support ofσ 1 , i say, is not optimal in period t. That is, any best response assigns zero probability to i in period t. From (19), player 2's beliefs give a probability of at least 1 − ζ to a strategy of player 1 that best responds to 2's best response toσ 1 , which means that player 2 believes that i is played with a probability of no more than ζ. But since β − ζ > ξ, this contradicts (18).
Proof of Theorem 2 (the Harder Case)
If players 1 and 2 are not symmetrically informed about 2's beliefs, then player 1 needs to know player 2's private history h 2s in order to predict 2's period-s beliefs and hence behavior. Unfortunately for player 1, she knows only her own private history h 1s .
We begin by identifying a circumstance under which the value of knowing player 2's private history becomes quite small. In general, telling player 1 the private history h 2t that player 2 observed through period t < s will be of use in helping 1 predict 2's period-s behavior. However, the following Lemma shows that for a given t, h 2t becomes of arbitrarily small use in predicting player 2's actions in period s as s → ∞.
The intuition is straightforward. Suppose first that h 2t is essential to predicting player 2's behavior in all periods s > t. Then, as time passes player 1 will figure out that h 2t actually occurred from her own observations. Hence, player 1 continues to receive information about this history from subsequent observations, reducing the value of having h 2t explicitly revealed. On the other hand if h 2t is of less and less use in predicting current behavior, then there is eventually no point in player 1 using it to predict player 2's behavior, again reducing the value of having h 2t revealed. In either case player 1's own period-s information swamps the value of learning h 2t , in the limit as s grows large.
Denote by β (A, B) the coarsest common refinement of the σ-algebras A and B. Thus, β (H 1s , H 2t ) is the σ-algebra describing player 1's information at time s if she were to learn the private history of player 2 at time t. We also write β (A, B) for β (A, {B, B c }).
Lemma 5 Suppose assumptions 1 and 2 hold. For any t > 0 and τ ≥ 0,
Proof. We first provide the proof for the case of τ = 0. Suppose that K ⊂ J t is a set of t-period player 2 action profiles (j 0 , j 1 , ..., j t−1 ). We also denote by K the event (i.e., subset of Ω) that the history of the first t-periods of player 2's action profiles are in K. By Bayes' rule and the finiteness of the action and signal spaces, we can write the conditional probability of the event K given the observation by player 1 of h 1,s+1 = (h 1s , y s , i s ) as follows 
] is player 1's conditional probability of observing the period-s signal y s given she takes action i s and hence is strictly positive and less than one by Assumption 1. Thus, we get,
The random variableP [K|H 1s ] is a martingale with respect to the filtration {H 1s }. Consequently it converges almost surely as s → ∞ and hence the left side of this inequality converges almost surely to zero. 15 The signals generated by player 2's actions satisfy Assumption 2, so an identical argument to that given at the end of Lemma 2 establishes that forP -almost all
The probabilityP [K|H 1s ] is a martingale on the filtration {H 1s } s with respect toP , and soP -almost surely converges to a nonnegative limit,
Since this holds for all K,
giving the result for τ = 0.
The proof for τ ≥ 1 follows by induction. In particular, we have where h 2,z+1 = (h 2z , y z , i z ). Hence,
The left side of this inequality converges to zeroP -almost surely, and hence so does the right side. Moreover, the right side is larger than
From the induction hypothesis that Ẽ [σ 2z |β (H 1s , H 2t )] −Ẽ[σ 2z |H 1s ] converges to zeroP -almost surely for every z ∈ {s, ..., s + τ − 1}, the negative term also converges to zeroP -almost surely. But then the first term also converges to zero, and, as above, the result holds for z = s + τ .
If theP limit of player 2's posterior belief p t is not zero, then (from Lemma 4) there must be a positive probability set of states of the world and a time T such that at time T , player 2 thinks he will play a best response to the commitment type in all future periods (with arbitrarily high probability). At time T , player 1 may not realize player 2 has such a belief. However, there is a positive measure set of states where an observer at time s, given the finer information partition β(H 1s , H 2t ), attaches high probability to player 2 playing a best response to the commitment type forever. However, by Lemma 5 we can then deduce that player 1 will also attach high probability to player 2 playing a best response to the commitment type for s large:
Lemma 6 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold andσ 1 is realization equivalent to a public strategy. Suppose, moreover, that there exists aP -positive measure set of states of the world for which lim t→∞ p t (ω) > 0. Then, for any ν > 0 and any integer τ > 0 there exists aP -positive measure set of states F † and a time T (ν, τ ) for which, for all s > T (ν, τ ), for all ω ∈ F † and any s ∈ {s, s + 1, ..., s + τ },
Proof. The first step of this proof establishes the existence of a positive probability event (P (F ) > 0) such that, for all t large, player 2 attaches high probability to always playing a best response to the commitment type in all future periods almost surely on F .
Define the event D η = {ω : lim t→∞ p t (ω) > 2η}. From Lemma 4, for sufficiently small η there exists F ⊂ D η such thatP (F ) = µ for some µ > 0 and such that, for any ξ < {µ 2 , ν 2 /9}, there exists T for which, on F and
where ψ > 0 is given by Lemma 3. Let
AsẼ[Z t |H 2t ] < ξψ for all t > T on F and Z t ≥ 0,P ({Z t > ψ}|H 2t ) < ξ for all t > T on F . This and Lemma 3 imply that, almost everywhere on F ,
This last argument uses the condition thatσ 1 is realization equivalent to a public strategy, ensuring thatσ 1s is measurable with respect to player 2's filtration. The second step in the proof shows that there is a positive probability set of states F * where (21) holds and where player 1 must also believe that player 2 is playing a best response to the commitment type with high probability. Now we define two types of event:
Note that K t ∈ H 2t and F ⊂ ∩ t>T K t . For a given t define the random variable g s to be theP -probability of the event G t conditional on the private history h 1s of player 1 and the private history h 2t of player 2, that is 16
where 1 Gt is the indicator function for the set G t . However,P (
For every ω ∈ K t ∈ H 2t it is the case thatP (
As F ⊂ K t , (22) holds for all ω ∈ F . The random variable g s is a bounded martingale with respect to the filtration {H 2s } and so converges almost surely to a limiting random variable, which we denote by g ∞ . There is aP -positive measure set F * ⊂ F and a time T t such that for s > T t , g s (ω) > 1 − 2 √ ξ on F * . 17 To summarize -for almost every state on F * and all t > T and all s > T t > T :
Finally, by Lemma 5 and an application of Egorov's Theorem, for any ξ > 0, ζ > 0 and τ there exists F † ⊂ F * satisfyingP (F * ) −P (F † ) < ζ and T τ such that for all s > T τ and s = s, s + 1, ..., s + τ ,
16 Recall that we use β(A, B) to denote the σ-algebra that is the coarsest common refinement of the σ-algebras A and B.
17 Proof: As F ⊂ Kt and µ =P (F ) we have thatP (F |Kt) = µ/P (Kt). However, if g∞ < 1 − √ ξ for almost every ω ∈ F , thenP (F |Kt) ≤P (g∞ < 1 − √ ξ|Kt). By (22) however, this implies thatP (F |Kt) ≤ √ ξ. CombiningP (F |Kt) = µ/P (Kt) and P (F |Kt) ≤ √ ξ, we get µ/ √ ξ ≤P (Kt), contradicting ξ < µ 2 . Hence, there exists a positive probability subset of F and a Tt such that on which gs ≥ 1 − 2 √ ξP -a.s. for all s > Tt.
Now, combine (24) and (25) with (23). This gives the result that there is a T and a T = max{T t , T τ } and F † such that for all t > T , all s > T t > T and s = s, s + 1, ..., s + τ :
Given 3 √ ξ < ν we have proved the lemma.
We can now prove Theorem 2. Intuitively, suppose the theorem is false and hence there is a positive measure set of states on which the limiting posterior p ∞ is positive. Sinceσ 1 is a pure strategy, it is realization equivalent to a pure public strategy. By Lemma 6 there is a set of states where, for all s sufficiently large, the normal type attaches high probability to player 2 best responding to the commitment type for the next τ periods. The normal type's best response is not the commitment strategy, which is never an equilibrium in the long run. At an equilibrium, therefore, the normal type is not playing the commitment strategy on this set of states. From Lemma 2, however, we know that player 2 believes the average strategy played by the normal type is close to the strategy played by the commitment type whenever the limiting posterior p ∞ is positive. Moreover, if the commitment type is playing a pure strategy, the expected strategy of the normal type can only converge to the commitment type's strategy if the probability (conditional upon player 2's information) that the normal type is not playing the commitment action is vanishing small. This will give a contradiction.
More formally, suppose there exists an equilibrium where p ∞ > 0 on a set of strictly positiveP -measure. Choose M > max ∈{1,2},i∈I,j∈J |π (i, j)|. Choose τ sufficiently large that δ τ 32M < ε, where ε is given by Definition 2. Also, choose ν sufficiently small for 14ε > (τ + 1) ν(32M + 15ε). By Lemma 6, there exists F † and a time T (ν, τ ) such for all t > T (ν, τ ) the normal type believes that player 2 is playing within ν of a best response to the commitment type over the next τ periods.
By our choice of τ any change in player 1's strategy after t+τ periods will change her expected discounted payoff at time t by at most ε/16. However, if player 2 always plays a best response toσ 1 , which is never an equilibrium in the long run, then there exists a deviation fromσ 1 that yields player 1 an increased discounted expected payoff of ε. This deviation must increase player 1's expected payoff by at least 15 16 ε over the first τ periods. On F † for t > T (ν, τ ), player 1 attaches probability at least 1 − (τ + 1) ν to player 2 playing a best response toσ 1 (h 1s ) in periods s = t, t+1, ..., t+τ . (Since the commitment type's strategy is public, the set of player 2's best responses tô σ 1 (h 1s ) is public, and any belief that player 2 is playing some best reply tô σ 1 (h 1s ) is equivalent to a point belief that player 2 is playing a particular, possibly randomized, best reply.) Thus her expected gain from the deviation is at least (1 − (τ + 1) ν) 15 16 ε + (τ + 1) ν(−2M ), which exceeds 1 16 ε (by our choice of ν), which is the largest payoff gain player 1 can achieve by adhering to the commitment strategy for τ periods and playing optimally thereafter. Hence, on F † for all t > T (ν, τ ), the continuation strategyσ 1 is not a best reply to the expected behavior of player 2.
Let F s t denote the subset of F † where the normal type's strategy first puts zero probability on the commitment action in period s ≥ t, i.e., if i z (ω) ∈ I denotes the action specified by the pure strategyσ 1 in period z in state ω (σ The remainder of the proof argues on the subsequence of t just identified. If we choose s to maximizeP (F s t ), thenP (F s t ) ≥P (F † )/(τ + 1). Moreover, there is a subset F ‡ ⊂ F † withP F ‡ > 0, and an increasing sequence of dates, {s m }, such that for all s m on F ‡ , σ 1sm −σ 1sm = 1.
As the random variable p sm σ 1sm −σ 1sm is non-negative,
From Corollary 1, we have
This uses the fact thatσ 1 is (realization equivalent to) a public strategy and soσ 1t =Ê[σ 1t |H 2t ]. Let i(h 2t ) be the pure action played by the commitment strategy after the history h 2t , that is,σ
(ω) = 1. (This is observable by player 2 at time t ifσ 1 is pure.) Then, as · is the supremum norm and both vectors are contained in ∆ I ,
Since p t is measurable with respect to the filtration {H 2t } t , we have
Now, taking an unconditional expectation of the conditional expectation, we get lim
contradicting (26).
Imperfect Private Monitoring
In this section, we briefly consider the case of imperfect private monitoring. At the end of the period, player 1 observes a private signal θ (drawn from a finite signal space Θ) of the action profile chosen in that period. Similarly, player 2 observes a private signal ζ (drawn from a finite signal space Z) of the action profile chosen in that period. Given the underlying action profile (i, j), we let ρ ij be a probability distribution over Θ × Z, so that ρ Assumption 5 ρ θ ij , ρ ζ ij > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ, ζ ∈ Z, and (i, j) ∈ I × J.
Note that we do not assume that ρ θζ ij > 0 for all (i, j) ∈ I × J and (θ, ζ) ∈ Θ × Z (which would rule out public monitoring). Rather the full-support assumption is that each signal is observed with positive probability under every action profile.
Even when monitoring is truly private, in the sense that ρ θζ ij > 0 for all (i, j) ∈ I × J and (θ, ζ) ∈ Θ × Z, reputations can have very powerful short-run effects. While Fudenberg and Levine (1992) explicitly assume the game has public monitoring, under the following identification assumption, the analysis of Fudenberg and Levine (1992) covers imperfect private monitoring, implying the following Theorem 5.
Assumption 6 For all j ∈ J, there are I linearly independent columns in the matrix (ρ ζ ij ) ζ∈Z,i∈I .
Theorem 5 Suppose the game has imperfect private monitoring satisfying Assumptions 5 and 6. Suppose the commitment type is a simple action type that plays the pure action i * in every period. For all priors p 0 > 0 and all ε > 0, there existsδ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ ∈ n δ , 1 , player 1's expected average discounted payoff in any Nash equilibrium is at least
where
Assumption 6 covers the setting where the signal of player 1's action is only observed by player 2, and player 1 observes no signal. 18 When player 1 also receives signals, we will need an assumption analogous to Assumption 4: Assumption 7 For all i ∈ I, there are J linearly independent columns in the matrix (ρ θ ij ) θ∈Θ,j∈J .
The result (the proof is essentially that of Theorem 2) in the setting with imperfect private monitoring is then:
Theorem 6 Suppose the imperfect private monitoring distribution ρ satisfies Assumptions 5, 6, and 7. Supposeσ 1 is a pure public strategy that is never an equilibrium strategy in the long run. In any Nash equilibrium, p t → 0P -almost surely.
If the monitoring is truly private, then there is no public information. In that case, a pure public strategy is simple, i.e., the same pure action taken in every period. 19 This is, of course, the typical type studied in applications.
Finally, it is straightforward to verify that Theorem 3 in Section 4.3 extends to the case of imperfect private monitoring.
Many Types
It is straightforward to extend the preceding analysis to case of many types.
Let T be the set of possible commitment types. The commitment type c plays the fixed, repeated-game strategyσ c 1 . We assume T is either finite or countably infinite. At time t = −1 a type of player 1 is selected. With probability p c 0 > 0, she is commitment type c, and with probability p n 0 = 1 − c∈T p c 0 she is the "normal" type. A state of the world is, as before, a type for player 1 and sequence of actions and signals. The set of states is then Ω = T × (I × J × Y ) ∞ . We denote byP c the probability measure induced on Ω by the commitment type c ∈ T , and as usual, we denote bỹ P the probability measure on Ω induced by the normal type. Finally, we denote by p c t player 2's period t belief that player 1 is the commitment type c.
Definition 5 A set of commitment types T is separated if for all c, c ∈ T ,
We first argue thatP c (F ) = 0. IfP c (F ) > 0, since the commitment types are separated, on a full measure subset of F ,
and so on this full measure subset, p c t → 0, contradicting (27). Thus, P c (F ) = 0.
However, since the unconditional probability of F is strictly positive,
ButP c (F ) = 0 implies E {p c t |F } = 0, a contradiction.
We then have:
Theorem 7 Suppose ρ satisfies Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. Suppose T is a separated set of commitment types and the support of the prior p 0 is T ∪ {n}. Let T * be the set of commitment types c ∈ T for whichσ c 1 is a public strategy with finite range that is never an equilibrium strategy in the long run. Then in any Nash equilibrium, p c t → 0 for all c ∈ T * P -almost surely.
Theorem 8 Suppose ρ satisfies Assumptions 1, 2, and 4. Suppose T is a separated set of commitment types and the support of the prior p 0 is T ∪ {n}. Let T * be the set of commitment types c ∈ T for whichσ c 1 is a pure strategy that is never an equilibrium strategy in the long run. Then in any Nash equilibrium, p c t → 0 for all c ∈ T * P -almost surely.
The proofs of these two results are almost identical to the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2, with the following change. Fix some type c ∈ T * . In the proofs, reinterpretP as P −c = c =c p c 0P c + p n 0P , the unconditional measure on Ω implied by the normal type and all the commitment types other than c . The only point at which it is important thatP is indeed the measure induced by the normal type is at the end of each proof, when the normal type has a profitable deviation that contradicts player 2's beliefs. We now apply Lemma 7. Since we are arguing on aP -positive probability subset where p c t is not converging to zero, every other commitment type is receiving little weight in 2's beliefs. Consequently, from player 2's point of view, eventually the measures P −c andP are sufficiently close to obtain the same contradictions.
Two Long-Run Players
Lemma 3 is the only place where the assumption that player 2 is shortlived makes an appearance. When player 2 is short-lived, player 2 is best responding to the current play of player 1, and so as long as player 2 is sufficiently confident that he is facing the commitment type, he will best respond to the commitment type. On the other hand, if player 2 is long-lived, like player 1, then there is no guarantee that this is still true. For example, player 2 may find experimentation profitable. Nonetheless, reputation effects can still be present (Celentani, Fudenberg, Levine, and Pesendorfer (1996) ). In order to extend our results to long-lived players we need an analog of Lemma 3. Again, for expositional clarity, we restrict attention to the case of a single commitment type.
Lemma 8 Supposeσ 1 is a public strategy implementable by a finite automaton, denoted (W, d, ϕ, w 0 ), and BR (σ 1 ; w ) is the set of best replies for player 2 to the public strategy implemented by the finite automaton (W, d, ϕ, w ), i.e., the initial state is w ∈ W . For any history h 2t , let w (h 2t ) ∈ W be the state reached from w 0 under the public history consistent with h 2t . Let (σ 1 , σ 2 ) be equilibrium strategies in the incomplete-information game where player 2 is long-lived with discount factor δ 2 ∈ [0, 1). If σ 2 is a pure strategy, then for all T > 0 there exists ψ > 0 such that if player 2 observes a history h 2t so that
then for some σ 2 ∈ BR (σ 1 ; w (h 2t )), the continuation strategy of σ 2 after the history h 2t agrees with σ 2 for the next T periods.
If player 2's posterior that player 1 is the commitment type fails to converge to zero on a set of states of positiveP -measure, then the same argument as in Lemma 4 shows that (28) holds (note that (14) in Lemma 4 usesP rather than P to evaluate the probability of the event of interest).
Proof. Fix T > 0. Since W is finite, it is enough to argue that for each w ∈ W , there is ψ w > 0 such that for such if player 2 observes a history h 2t so that w = w (h 2t ) and
then for some σ 2 ∈ BR (σ 1 ; w), the continuation strategy of σ 2 after the history h 2t agrees with σ 2 for the next T periods. Fix a private history for player 2, h 2t . Letσ 1 (h 2s ) denote the play of the finite automaton (W, d, ϕ, w (h 2t )) after the public history consistent with h 2s , where h 2t is the initial segment of h 2s . Since player 2 is discounting, there exists T such for any w ∈ W , there is ε w > 0 such that if for s = t, . . . , t + T and for all h 2s with initial segment h 2t ,
Recall that γ ≡ min y,ij ρ y ij and set ψ w = 1 2 min ε w , γ T . Suppose (29) holds with this ψ w . We claim that (30) holds for s = t, . . . , t + T and for all h 2s with initial segment h 2t . Suppose not. Since player 2 is following a pure strategy, the probability of the continuation history h 2s , conditional on the history h 2t , is at least γ T . Thus,
contradicting (29), since γ T > ψ w .
With this result in hand, the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 go through as before, extending our result to two long-lived players, provided the commitment type is a public strategy implementable by a finite automaton and player 2 plays a pure strategy in the Nash equilibrium.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3 (Section 4.3)
Proof. Since p t → 0P -almost surely, we have p t → 1P -almost surely. For any ε, ν > 0 there exists a T such that for all t > T ,P (p t > ε) +P (p t < 1 − ε) < ν. Hence, for t > T , where M is an upper bound on the magnitude of the stage-game payoffs and the first inequality holds because we have a subjective correlated equilibrium. As ξ 2 is measurable with respect to p t , we can ensure that the final integral in the preceding expression is zero by setting ξ 2 (s 2 , p t ) = s 2 for p t > ε, and hence, for any ε, ν > 0 and for all ξ 2 , Consider now a convergent subsequence, denotedμ t k with limitμ ∞ , and supposeμ ∞ is not a correlated equilibrium. Since (8) holds for all t , it also holds in the limit, and so for some t and some ξ 2 : S 2 → S 2 , there exists κ > 0 so that 
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4 (Section 4.4)
We begin by focusing on games that are "close" to the complete-information game.
Lemma A Let (i * , j * ) be a strict Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. For all T , there existsη > 0 such that for all p 0 ∈ (0,η), there is a Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game in which the normal type plays i * and player 2 plays j * for the first T periods, irrespective of history.
Proof. Let ε = 1 2 [π 1 (i * , j * ) − max i =i * π 1 (i, j * )] > 0. Since the Nash equilibrium correspondence is upper hemicontinuous, there exists η > 0 and a Nash equilibrium of the complete-information game, σ (0), such that for each belief p ∈ [0, η ), there is a Nash equilibrium of the incompleteinformation game, σ (p), satisfying |E p u 1 (σ (p)) − E 0 u 1 (σ (0))| < ε 2 , where E p denotes taking expectations with probability p on the commitment type.
Since j * is player 2's strict best response to i * , there exists η > 0 so that for all p t < η , j * is still a best response to the normal type playing i * . Now, for any T , there existsη > 0 so that if p 0 <η, max p t < min{η , η } for all t ≤ T . The equilibrium strategy profile is to play (i * , j * ) for the first T periods (ignoring history), and then play according to the strategy profile identified in the previous paragraph for the belief p T , σ (p T ). By construction, no player has an incentive to deviate and so the profile is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
While the equilibrium just constructed yields payoffs to player 1 that are close to π 1 (i * , j * ), the equilibrium guarantees nothing about asymptotic play. The equilibrium of the next Lemma does.
Lemma B Let (i * , j * ) be a strict Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. For all ε > 0, there exists η > 0 such that for all p 0 ∈ (0, η], there is a Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information game, σ * * (p 0 ), in which thẽ P -probability of the event that (i * , j * ) is played in every period is at least 1 − ε.
Proof. Fix ζ = 1 3 [π 1 (i * , j * ) − max i =i * π 1 (i, j * )] > 0, and choose T large enough so that δ T M < ζ 2 (recall that M is an upper bound for stage game payoffs) and that the average discounted payoff to player 1 from T periods of (i * , j * ) is within ζ 2 of π 1 (i * , j * ). Denote byη the upper bound on beliefs given in Lemma A. For any prior p ∈ (0,η) that player 1 is the commitment type, let σ * (p) denote the equilibrium of Lemma A. By construction, σ * (p) yields player 1 an expected payoff within ζ of π 1 (i * , j * ).
There exists η <η such that if p t < η , then the posterior after T periods, p t+T (p t ), is necessarily belowη. Consider the following strategy profile, consisting of two phases. In the first phase, play (i * , j * ) for T periods, ignoring history. In the second phase, behavior depends on the posterior beliefs of player 2, p t+T (p t ). If p t+T (p t ) > η , play σ * (p t+T (p t )). If p t+T (p t ) ≤ η , begin the first phase again.
By construction, the continuation payoffs at the end of the first phase are all within ζ of π 1 (i * , j * ), and so for any prior satisfying p 0 < η , the strategy profile is an equilibrium.
By Theorem 1, p t → 0P -almost surely, and so sup t ≥t p t → 0P -almost surely. By Egorov's Theorem, there exists a t * such thatP sup t ≥t * p t > η < ε. But then for some history for player 2, h 2t * ,P sup t ≥t * p t > η |h 2t * < ε. By the construction of the equilibrium, the continuation play after such a history (which necessarily leads to a belief, p t * (h 2t * ), for player 2 satisfying p t * (h 2t * ) ≤ η ) is identical to that in the incomplete-information game with initial prior p 0 = p t * (h 2t * ). Thus, for the incomplete-information game with prior p 0 = p t * (h 2t * ), the probability that the posterior after any history exceeds η is no more than ε.
The proof is completed by setting η = p t * (h 2t * ), since for all t and all h 2t , we have p t (h 2t ; p 0 ) < p t (h 2t ; p 0 ) for any prior p 0 < p t * (h 2t * ).
We can then prove Theorem 4:
Proof. We prove this by first constructing an equilibrium of an artificial game, and then arguing that this equilibrium induces an equilibrium with the desired properties in the original game.
Fix ε and the corresponding η from Lemma B. In the artificial game, player 2 has the action space J × {g, e} × [0, 1], where we interpret g as "go," e as "end," and p ∈ [0, 1] as an announcement of the posterior belief of player 2. The game is over immediately when player 2 chooses e. The payoffs for player 2 when player 2 ends the game with the announcement of p depend on the actions as well as on the type of player 1 (recall that n is the normal type and c is the commitment type): π * 2 (i, j, e, p; n) = π 2 (i, j) + η − p 
